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[Dear Schmoozers: Below are the Intro and Part II of a project on the original executive’s
impotency during emergencies. Looking forward to the fun].
Introduction

The President seems tailor-made for emergencies. Unlike Congress, the executive
branch does not have sessions and recesses. Instead, the executive is always on duty, with
every presidential vacation a working one. Unlike Congress, the executive branch does not
contain numerous vetogates, 1 procedural steps that either delay or preclude final action.
Rather, the President can make rapid, even hasty, decisions because they are his alone to
make. Unlike the courts, the executive need not hear from interested parties before
resolving some matter. To the contrary, the President may decide an issue ex parte,
dispensing with briefs, arguments, and reasoning. Unlike his sluggish and contemplative
counterparts, the President is like a tightly coiled spring, full of potential energy, ready to
act when a crisis erupts.

But wait, there’s more: The Constitution’s text hints at an energetic emergency
executive. The President may command the state militias to “suppress insurrections and
repel invasions.” 2 The President is Commander in Chief of the army and navy, 3 both of
which may be deployed to crush rebels and invaders. Finally the President must “preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution,” 4 a vow perhaps premised on the notion that the
Constitution supplies the wherewithal to honor this pledge. Some scholars have argued that
the President’s supposed power to take whatever measures are necessary to save the
Constitution subsumes the power to take measures necessary to save the nation itself. After
all, there can be no Constitution of the United States, in a meaningful sense, without the
United States. 5

One might even suppose that the Presidency was crafted with emergencies in mind.
Consider a somewhat obscure passage from THE FEDERALIST. Extolling the importance of
“Energy in the Executive”, Publius insisted that such energy “is essential to the protection of
the community against foreign attacks; . . . to the protection of property . . . ; to the security
of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.” 6 As if
to leave no doubt where he stood, Publius embraced what, for many, must be one of the
most troubling examples of an energetic executive:

1

Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how
often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute
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power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator,
as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who
aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes . . .
whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as
against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the
conquest and destruction of Rome. 7

Some might find within this paean to the Roman dictatorship the suggestion that the
Constitution itself provides for an autocracy in crisis, with the President as the ultimate and
dynamic defender of the American Republic. Perhaps the Founders crafted a modest
peacetime executive who could, when crisis struck, serve as dictator. In war or rebellion,
maybe the President was to become a Camillus or a Cincinnatus, benevolent dictators each.
After navigating the storm, the President would “retire” to his set of more ordinary powers.

Presidents and scholars favoring vigor in crises have read the Constitution as ceding
extraordinary powers to the President. Theodore Roosevelt’s steward theory claimed the
power to do anything not expressly forbidden by statute or the Constitution, 8 a reading that
ensured ample executive discretion in crises. Abraham Lincoln suspended habeas corpus
and freed Southern slaves, at times claiming a right to do anything necessary to save the
Union. 9 Professor Michael Paulson ardently backs Lincoln’s Constitution of Necessity. 10
Similarly, John Yoo argues that “the executive power . . . contains a power to address
national emergencies and crises.” 11 Finally, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend that
emergency powers should rest with the President because he can best wield them. 12

Whether chief executives have an array of emergency powers is a question older
than the Constitution, for it was on the minds of many in England and America before the
Constitution was even a glimmer in anyone’s eye. It is also question that will never go away.
It recurs whenever we are at war, foreign or civil. Such issues arose during the
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, and, of course, the Civil
War. In the recent past, George W. Bush claimed a power to try non-citizens before military
commissions. 13 More recently, when it seemed that Congress might not raise the statutory
debt-ceiling, scholars claimed that the President could ignore that statute in order to avert
an economic calamity. 14 Going forward, what is certain is that Chief Executives (and their
7
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acolytes) will claim extraordinary authority in extraordinary times, reading the supposed
ambiguities of Article II as an invitation to act.

Despite all that can be said in favor of an energetic emergency executive—the
compelling arguments from policy, text, structure, and practice—the Founders rendered the
Chief Executive almost entirely impotent in crises. The original Constitution did not vest the
President with legal authority to act contra legem or to do whatever he judged necessary to
save the nation or the Constitution. So feckless was the President that he even lacked
authority to take temporary measures to preserve the status quo until Congress could
address an incipient crisis. In a nutshell, the Constitution fashioned an imbecilic emergency
executive, one wholly lacking constitutional authority to take property, suspend habeas
corpus, or impose military justice.

The Presidency’s impotence in emergencies comes into focus when we consider its
antecedents. Each of its predecessors—the Crown, the state governors, and the protonational executives under the Continental Congress—lacked a generic emergency power.
This was the background against which the Constitution was created. 15

The Crown lacked authority to act contra legem, as is clear from many laws of
Parliament. The English Bill of Rights specifically prohibited the Crown from suspending
the law or issuing individualized dispensations permitting individuals to ignore the law. 16
In 1760, the Parliament reaffirmed this principle when it rebuked the executive for
suspending a law in the midst of deadly riots. 17

The state executives likewise could not act contrary to established law. Nor could
they take property or impose martial law 18 on civilians. A few had express constitutional
authority to lay temporary embargoes and a number could summon the assembly to secure
whatever crisis legislation the latter deemed necessary. But by virtue of their constitutions
alone the executives were almost powerless in emergencies. As one executive lamented
during the Revolutionary War, the state constitution had left his office in a “state of
imbecility.” 19

When we look to the Continental Commander in Chief, we again discover an
executive bereft of the power to take property, suspend habeas corpus, or try civilians.
Neither the Continental Congress nor George Washington believed that the office of
Commander in Chief came with such powers. Washington only exercised such powers when
Congress granted them via temporary laws.
The Constitution never energized the executive in emergencies. To be sure, the
President was to enjoy the four requisites of energy—unity, duration, adequate support,
and competent powers—thus making it possible for him to act with “[d]ecision, activity,
15
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secrecy, and dispatch.” 20 Yet insofar as the Constitution was concerned, the President was
no less imbecilic than his immediate predecessors, the state governors and the Continental
Commander in Chief.

We know this because the Constitution’s makers used the same phrases—“executive
power” and “commander in chief”— found in the state constitutions. Phrases that never
conveyed emergency powers in the states could not plausibly be read as ceding crisis
powers in the federal Constitution. Likewise, if the Continental Army’s Commander in Chief
lacked emergency powers under the Articles, there is little reason to think that the office
sprouted emergency powers when the Constitution made the President the Commander in
Chief, ex officio.

Confirming this reading, the Constitution contains clues suggesting the Chief
Executive lacks an emergency power. To begin with, he cannot raise taxes, issue debt, or
appropriate funds. Those powers—authorities crucial to weathering crises—rest
exclusively with Congress. 21 Moreover, the Commander in Chief could command no one
until and unless Congress raised armies, launched a navy, and authorized the summoning of
the state militias. 22 Finally, the Founders’ Constitution never authorized the President to
suspend civil liberties in crises; he could not suspend the privilege of the writ, much less
suspend the privilege of a jury trial by authorizing military trial of civilians. In sum, all
powers necessary and proper to overcome emergencies—raising taxes and soldiers, issuing
debt, making appropriations, summoning militias, and suspending civil liberties—rested
with Congress. 23
This is not to say that the Executive was entirely impotent in the face of crisis. The
President could summon Congress; 24 propose and influence the shape of crisis legislation; 25
and appoint officers during a Senate recess. 26 These authorities make the Constitution’s
Commander in Chief more powerful than his predecessor, even as the office remained
without authority to appropriate funds, raise armies, seize property, or suspend civil
liberties. In sum, while the President is more powerful than his predecessors, he was not
made appreciably stronger when it came to acting unilaterally in crisis.

On many questions, it may well be that “[j]ust what our forefathers did envision . . .
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon
to interpret for Pharaoh.” 27 And it may be the case that on some constitutional issues, the
20
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Founders “largely cancel each other.” 28 But on the question of executive power in
emergencies—the very question that triggered Justice Robert Jackson’s assertions in
Youngstown—there is no enigma or contradictory evidence. The founders crafted an
executive authorized to act quickly, responsibly and energetically, but not one empowered
to take whatever emergency measures he deemed requisite. And there was no division on
this question.
The limited nature of the claim must be underscored. The Constitution as it is
implemented today often bears only a faint resemblance to the original framework. The
arguments made here hardly establish that the President does not have or should not have
emergency powers. This paper only denies that the original Constitution ever vested such
powers. If the President now may invade private right, suspend habeas corpus, or
appropriate funds, it is because Presidents have acquired it over the course of our nation’s
innumerable crises, large and small, real and imagined. To borrow from Felix Frankfurter,
practices may have glossed the “executive power”, giving it a sheen it originally lacked. 29

Part I lays out different conceptions of presidential authority in emergencies. Part II
considers the emergency authority of precursors to the President—the English Crown, the
state executives, and the Continental Commander in Chief—and argues that none had a
constitutional power to act contrary to law, take property, suspend habeas corpus, or
declare martial law. Part III considers constitutional text and structure and argues that the
President likewise lacks an emergency power to act contra legem, invade private right, or
suspend constitutional liberties. Part IV describes early practice under the Constitution up
to the Civil War. Part V addresses the modern era where the President is widely thought to
have some emergency powers, albeit with uncertain and contested bounds.
Part III. A Tradition of Imbecility

*

*

*

To understand why early Presidents had a modest conception of their emergency
powers, we need to forget, for the moment, our modern constitutional sensibilities, shaped
as they are by the Civil War. We also need to shunt aside the widely shared perception that
the modern world, with its many existential threats, requires vigorous executive
unilateralism during crises. Instead we must hearken back to the period immediately
preceding the Constitution, an era of different sensibilities.

In some ways, the era’s executives stood poles apart. Americans came to see George
III as a symbol of executive excess, partly because The Declaration of Independence had
railed against his abuses. The Commander in Chief of the Continental Army was the most
venerated man in America, even as he was the most powerless chief executive of his era.
28
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George Washington was a creature of the Continental Congress, serving at its pleasure and
dutifully obeying its operational directives. The state executives, largely the products of
jealousy towards all things executive, were arrayed in between the Georges. Unlike
Washington, they had constitutionally-granted powers; they were not all mere creatures of
statute. Unlike the Crown, they often served for short tenures, were term limited, and
rarely had a veto.
Whatever their differences, if the era’s chief executives generally had broad
emergency power, temporary or otherwise, we have good reason to read Article II as
conveying the same, via the executive power or the grant of the office of Commander in
Chief. After all, that backdrop of executive vigor should be considered when trying to make
sense of the grants in Article II.

By the same token, if the era’s chief executives were relatively impotent in crisis—if
they could not try civilians before military tribunals or suspend habeas corpus—that fact
should influence how we read the Constitution, because it likewise supplies contextual clues
about its meaning. Against a backdrop of executive weakness in emergencies, the architects
of a new framework would do their best to make clear that they meant to depart from
familiar, lest their purposes be mistaken or overlooked. In a regime of enumerated powers,
radical departures from tradition require new text, especially when one hopes to infuse new
powers into a familiar institution.

So what crisis authority did executives of the era enjoy? The Crown lacked anything
resembling a generic “emergency power”, temporary or otherwise. In peacetime, the Crown
could not increase the size of the army, raise taxes, or impose embargoes, whatever the
crisis. During a war, however, the Crown could raise armies and impose embargoes and
might have been empowered to impose martial law. In contrast, American state and
national executives were just as feeble in war as they were in peace. By virtue of their
offices, they could not take property, raise armies, or impose martial law. Such authority
came, if at all, via legislative grants, meaning that in crises American executives were
anemic until legislatures decreed otherwise.

Yet this constitutional feebleness was not widely perceived as a flaw, because
governments were able to outlast crises without having to cede, via constitutional grants,
extensive authority to the executive. The endurance of the American system likely left the
impression that there was no need for written constitutions to delegate sweeping
emergency power to the executive. Instead, legislatures could delegate crisis authority via
temporary and highly-tailored grants.
A.

The English Monarchy in the Late 18th Century

By the 18th century, the English had discarded the Lockean prerogative. We know
this because constitutional settlements, reflected in statutes, had hemmed in the Crown.
Written about the same time of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, the 1689 English
Bill of Rights 30 codified the view that Parliament’s laws reigned supreme even over
traditional conceptions of the Crown’s executive power.
30

1 W. & M., § 2, cl. 2 (1689).

The contours of the Bill are key. It denounced the “pretended” regal power of
granting individualized dispensations from statutory strictures. 31 It condemned the
“pretended” power of suspending Parliament’s laws. It declared that the Crown could not
“levy[] money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative,” 32, thereby
decreeing that the Crown could not raise taxes. Finally it specified that the Crown could not
raise or keep armies in the kingdom without Parliament’s consent in times of peace. 33

Did the Bill of Rights permit these executive measures in emergencies? Generally
speaking, no. The Bill contained no express exception permitting the forbidden actions
when the Crown believed that suspensions, dispensations, taxation, or appropriations were
indispensable due to some crisis. Any generic implicit exemption is extremely unlikely
because the Bill of Rights expressly claimed that executive suspensions, dispensations, and
tax impositions were “illegal” and that raising armies was “against the law”.

Two textual clues strengthen the implication that the Bill of rights did not permit
these executive measure during emergencies. First, the Bill made clear that its restrictions
did not apply when Parliament had ceded discretion to the Crown, thereby suggesting that
the relevant executive acts were legal only when Parliament gave its approval. 34 Second, by
declaring that Crown could not raise or keep Armies in the kingdom, “in time of peace,” the
Bill conceded that the Crown could do either during wars and rebellions. 35 This concession
was necessary because it, alone among the Bill’s limitations, was inapplicable when the
kingdom was at war.

But we need not rely solely upon inferences from the Bill of Rights. An episode from
the 18th century makes clear that the Crown lacked authority to act contra legem. When the
Crown blocked the export of corn in the mid-1800s, Parliament responded in a way that
shed light on the Crown’s powers in domestic emergencies. 36 Think of it as the
Youngstown 37 of 18th century England. 38

In early 1766, a torrential downpour sharply reduced grain yields. While
Parliament was in recess, grain prices skyrocketed, triggering riots. Mobs destroyed flour
mills and seized foodstuffs; 39 some culprits were imprisoned and others hanged. 40
Believing that it could not wait until Parliament reconvened, the Crown resolved to act
unilaterally, banning grain exports in order to preserve the supply for the domestic market,
drive prices lower, and end the rioting. In an argument Abraham Lincoln would find
congenial, George III said “great evils must require at times extraordinary measures to
remove them.” 41 Unlike Lincoln’s measures, the Crown’s proclamation expressly provided
31
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that its export ban lapsed three days after Parliament returned. This was an implicit
acknowledgement that any final decision rested with Parliament. To some of the Crown’s
advisors, the measure must have seemed necessary and legal. Others, including the Lord
Chancellor, had their doubts. 42

When Parliament reconvened, King George III’s address referenced the export ban,
without acknowledging its illegality and without asking for any bill to indemnify his
ministers and officers against suits. Justifying the measure, George III said “[t]he urgency of
the necessity called upon me . . . to exert my royal authority for the preservation of the
public safety, against a growing calamity which could not admit of delay.” 43 Because the ban
would soon expire, the Crown referenced the possibility of new legislation. But by not
admitting the illegality of the export ban, the Crown seemed to be reasserting a pre-Bill of
Rights power to temporarily suspend laws. 44

When the Lords convened, members criticized the Crown, with some insisting on a
new bill that would reassert Parliamentary supremacy. In response, William Pitt quoted the
portion of Locke’s Second Treatise that argued that the Crown had a power to act contra
legem. But he also seemed to back away from the implication, supposedly denouncing it.
Lord Camden declared that the suspension established “at worst but forty days’ tyranny.” 45
Astonished, a member replied that once a dispensing power was established, “you cannot be
sure of either liberty or law for forty minutes.”
Without definitively addressing the legality of the ban, Lord Mansfield, the Chief
Justice, delicately suggested an act of indemnity to protect those who enforced the embargo.
Such an act would benefit the judiciary immensely because it would not have to decide the
legality of the executive’s ban. In fact, exporters had sought damages against customs
officials who were enforcing the Crown’s export bar.

Agreeing with Lord Mansfield, Parliament passed an act of indemnity. Rather than
sidestepping the export ban’s legality, however, Parliament rebuked those who had advised
it. The Act’s preamble declared that the export bar “could not be justified by Law” but that
because it was “for the service of the public” and “necessary,” it should be “justified by Act of
Parliament.” It proceeded to indemnify against any act “advised, commanded, appointed, or
done” relating to the embargo. 46 The Act thus conspicuously rejected the attempt to
resurrect the Crown’s power to suspend statutes, even though the suspension was
concededly introduced for the public good. While salus populi might be the supreme rex in
an abstract sense, it was not the supreme law in England. Only Parliament’s laws had that
status. Because the King-in-Parliament had permitted the export of grain at the time of the
executive’s ban, the Crown could not unilaterally forbid grain export. 47
42
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The Act’s preamble carried an important constitutional lesson, for it reaffirmed
what was implicit in the Bill of Rights. The executive could not, as a legal matter, create,
modify, or suspend laws, in a domestic crisis, even when doing so was for the public good.
As a member of Parliament, William Blackstone witnessed the debate and referenced it in
later editions of his COMMENTARIES. 48 Those Founders who read the American printing
would have known of the episode and Blackstone’s more general conclusion that the Crown
could not act contrary to law.

Did the Crown have an emergency power during wars and rebellions? In some
respects the answer was clearly “yes”. As noted, the Bill of Right’s bar on raising and
keeping a domestic peacetime army implied that the Crown could deploy, at will, the army
overseas and might raise and keep a standing army in England in time of war. 49 Moreover,
the Crown could impose embargoes during wars. 50

One aspect of the Crown’s power during wars and rebellions was uncertain and
contested, namely the power to impose martial law. R. E. Kostal describes various crises
and cases throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries that touched upon the issue, with no
uncontested or easy answer emerging. 51 Based on the Petition of Right 52 and a few cases, 53
some thought that the Crown could never use military commissions to try civilians; 54
perhaps it was left to Parliament to impose martial law. 55 Others seemed to admit that such
commissions might be used when the ordinary courts were closed. 56 And still others
claimed that whenever war, of whatever sort, was afoot the Crown could subject to martial
law those suspected of aiding the enemy, even if the courts were open. 57 These
disagreements about martial law would continue through the 19th century.

The Corn Crisis demonstrated not only that the Crown could not act contra legem, it
also revealed that the Crown lacked a provisional emergency power in peacetime. The
Crown had more authority in wartime, particularly with respect to military discipline,
embargoes, and raising armies. Whether the Crown could impose martial law in wartime is
more obscure because it was so contested.
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B. The State Executives
Reflecting a jealousy of executive power, 58 the state constitutions drew from the
English Bill of Rights. Some expressly provided that no one but the legislature could
suspend the law. For instance, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 declared “[t]hat no power
of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, unless by or derived from the Legislature,
ought to be exercised or allowed.” 59 Like their English precursor, these provisions lacked
emergency exceptions. Moreover, because the constitutions were themselves law, the state
bar on suspensions meant that the executive could not suspend constitutional provisions,
either separation of powers clauses or rights provisions.

Yet focusing on the anti-suspension clauses obscures the extent to which it was
widely understood that state executives lacked crisis powers. Consider their travails during
the War of Independence. State executives faced the daunting task of defeating an imperial
power at its height. To succeed they not only had to defeat the enemy on the battlefield,
they also had to secure military supplies, apprehend spies, and maintain civil government. 60
Though state constitutions often made their chief executives commander in chief and
almost always granted them “executive power,” 61 those executives lacked any sort of
emergency power. To the contrary, they were remarkably feeble in crises. The leading
historian on the war governors, Margaret Burnham MacMillan, noted that the constitutions
ceded executives “limited powers entirely inadequate for dealing with [] emergencies.” 62
Consider Pennsylvania’s plural executive (“the Supreme Executive Council”)
endowed with the “executive power.” 63 The Council’s President informed General
Washington that it could no longer seize supplies because a statutory grant had expired. 64
It may seem strange . . . that we have not legal power to impress a single
horse or wagon, let the emergency be what it will, nor have we any legal
power whatever over property in any instance of public distress . . . . In this
state of imbecility . . . we regret our inability to answer the public
expectation with the keenest sensibility. 65

Another chief executive spoke for most when he lamented the lapse of emergency
legislation, for he was now “left to the Constitution which may do in Peace but is by no
means adapted to war.” 66

These complaints were predictable, at least once one grasps that the state
constitutions ceded few emergency powers to the executive. Moreover, executives often
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will be tempted to claim that their powers are inadequate to the task at hand both to
acquire greater powers and deflect blame if there response to some catastrophe seems
inadequate.

Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that state executives were feckless in
emergencies. First, several had constitutional authority to impose embargoes (bans on the
export of goods and material). 67 Because the state constitutions were products of a war,
one has to suppose the executive was given authority to lay embargoes during the ongoing
war as a means of preventing the export of needed supplies (weapons, raw materials, and
food); without such grants, there would have been no unilateral executive authority.
Moreover, as the Crisis of 1766 demonstrated, this authority might be crucial during peace.
Embargoes could be used as a means of lowering prices during times of high inflation,
thereby staving off riots or rebellion.
The embargo provisions were hardly blank checks. Rather they did no more than
grant authority to impose short-term embargoes when the legislature was in recess. The
implication is that legislatures had exclusive power over long-term export bans and on
short-term bans when in session. Needless to say, it is hard to read those state constitutions
that granted their executives authority to impose interim export bans during a legislative
recess as if they also implicitly ceded far more consequential power to their executives, such
as the powers to seize war material, to raise armies and taxes, and sacrifice individual
liberties for the sake of defeating the enemy or rebels.

Second, many chief executives could summon their legislature. 68 Some constitutions
provided that this power could be used whenever the executive thought it “necessary.” 69
For others, the power could be exercised only in an “emergency.” 70 In those states that
limited the power to crises only, constitutional structure strongly suggested that the
executives lacked a generic emergency power. After all, an executive with a Lockean
prerogative to do whatever was necessary during a crisis, including a power to act contra
legem, had no need to summon the legislature in an emergency.

Third, the power to summon the legislature was an important means of acquiring
delegated authority. So while state executives were generally feckless by virtue of their
constitutions alone, no constitution ever required or mandated executive imbecility.
Oftentimes the legislatures granted executive requests for delegated authority because they
agreed that the crisis called for such delegations.
67
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So the constitutions granted little crisis authority and were generally understood to
leave the state executives in an imbecilic state, at least until statutes ameliorated that
feebleness. Yet navigating the twists and turns of war sometimes requires extraordinary
action. Little wonder that executives occasionally took measures that were constitutionally
and statutorily unauthorized. Such unilateral action—often dealing with supplies—was
seen as illegal, despite the necessity. When Washington pushed George Clinton of New York
to supply flour, the Governor illegally seized some. 71 Another time, Clinton advised officers
to seize nails, claiming that necessity justified the seizure. 72 Yet he admitted that necessity
was not a legal defense, but a practical one: “[I]t is not in my Power as Gov’r [to impress] & I
ought to be cautious how I walk.” 73

When executives took such crisis measures they often sought post hoc legislative
sanction. 74 After one executive illegally transferred cannons to Washington’s army, 75 he
sought and received legislative sanction. 76 Similarly, the Virginia legislature “legalize[d]
certain acts” of its governor, finding that they were “evidently productive of general good
and warranted by necessity.” 77 Of course, indemnification would have been unnecessary if
the executive had legal authority to take needed measures during crises. It was essential
precisely because the executive occasionally took illegal, but necessary, actions.

Three lessons emerge from the state experience. First, although almost all
executives enjoyed express grants of executive power and many served as commander in
chief, none of them acted as if they had constitutional authority to take any and all
emergency measures. In other words, even though state constitutions were created in the
crucible of crisis, they were most certainly not constitutions of necessity insofar as the
executives were concerned. Relatedly, executives never claimed authority to do anything
not specifically prohibited by law, meaning that they did not view themselves as
Rooseveltian stewards, able to do anything that that might further the commonweal.
Finally, no chief executive asserted constitutional authority to take temporary emergency
measures that preserved the status quo for the legislature, except where the Constitution
expressly granted as much, as in the case of embargoes. In the midst of a civil war that
threatened their “Lives”, “Fortunes” and “sacred Honor”, 78 executives felt rather handcuffed.

Second, and just as important for our purposes, when executives took measures in
the absence of statutory and constitutional authority—such as seizing supplies or giving
state property away—they admitted that they were acting illegally and sought legislative
sanction. In so doing, the executives understood that they lacked constitutional authority to
do anything that might win the war.
The final lesson relates to the perceived inadequacies of the system of weak crisis
executives. Though executives complained about the constitutional architecture, we should
be skeptical. In the midst of a crisis, those in power often will believe that all manner of
71
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obstacles will be overcome only if they are given more authority and a freer hand. But
believing so does not necessarily make it true.

Whatever the case may be, we need not delve too deeply into their protests. The
important question is how well did the system of weak crisis executives function. One is
tempted to say quite well. Despite the frail executives, the Revolution was won and, for the
most part, the state executives and legislatures acquitted themselves well enough. So while
those who served as governors might have thought the system was imbecilic and
inadequate, it is quite likely that many disagreed, having witnessed the general framework’s
success. Indeed, it seems likely that the perceived successes of the scheme of weak crisis
executives might have influenced the structure of any new system erected in its wake.
C. The Continental Commander in Chief

One of the factors propelling the victory over the British was the leadership of the
Commander in Chief. If George Washington had sweeping emergency powers perhaps the
vigorous exercise of such powers compensated for the feebleness of the state chief
executives. In fact, the Commander in Chief did not regard his office as ceding him power to
take property, enlarge the army, suspend habeas corpus, or declare martial law. Congress
agreed with that assessment. General Washington was no more powerful in crises than the
state chief executives. In some respects, he was weaker.

Congress appointed Washington in June of 1775. His commission made him
“General and Commander-in-chief of the army of the United Colonies, and of all the forces
raised or to be raised by them, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service and
join the said army.” 79 The Commission required soldiers and officers to obey Washington.
It also gave him “full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare
of the service.” 80

At first glance, the office may appear rather powerful. Yet a careful reading of the
commission and an examination of Washington’s actions reveals otherwise. To begin with,
he lacked “full power and authority” to do anything he thought useful for the “good and
welfare of” the United Colonies as a whole. Rather he could only act for the good and welfare
of the “service”, namely the army.

Presumably this meant that he could command soldiers and issue standing orders
governing a camp. But what of other powers? Could the Commander, ex officio, raise new
troops or set soldier pay, on the theory that doing so would enhance the army’s welfare?
Could he impress supplies to feed and clothe his men? Could he arrest or detain treasonous
individuals who plotted the army’s destruction? Finally, could he subject civilians to
military justice when doing so might benefit the army, and, by extension, the Revolution?

We know that Washington could do none of these things because Congress
occasionally granted power to take supplies, arrest Tories, and impose martial law. 81 Such
emergency resolves had features that confirmed that they were but temporary
augmentations of the office. Almost always, the grants were temporary, made to expire
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during a coming session of the Continental Congress. 82 Occasionally, the grants were
geographically limited to a radius around a camp or the scene of ongoing hostilities. 83
There was no reason to limit the crisis authority in duration and geographical scope if the
Commander already enjoyed a generic crisis power to impress supplies, suspend habeas
corpus, or impose martial law.

The genesis of some statutory grants also suggests that the office of Commander in
Chief was bereft of crisis authority. Often, the Continental Congress granted emergency
powers because the Commander in Chief requested as much. 84 Washington’s desire for
statutory authority was an implicit acknowledgment that his office did not encompass
power to impress supplies, arrest civilians, or try them via courts martial. While
commanders in chief could command the troops, they could not take any measure that
might further the army’s welfare, much less any thought necessary to defeat the enemy.
Finally consider Washington’s careful respect for the terms of crisis legislation. The
Commander always strictly complied with congressional law, never venturing beyond its
terms. When a civilian was executed for his “heinous” crime, Washington rebuked the
responsible army officer, saying that crime was not cognizable by the military courts and
that Congress had not authorized capital punishment, even on soldiers. 85 Another time,
Washington declared that martial law could no longer be applied against civilians because
the law that had permitted it had expired the day before. 86 In a third instance, the General
condemned the trial of a civilian who had been caught far from headquarters because it was
statutorily unauthorized. “There is a resolve of Congress, empowering Courts Martial to
take cognizance of inhabitants who have any communication of Trade or intelligence . . .
with the enemy . . . ; but the operation of this law is limited to persons” captured with 30
miles of headquarters “which prevents its applications to the present case.” 87 Washington
hewed strictly to congressional delegations because they were the only sources under
which he could seize property, hold civilians indefinitely, or try them before military courts.
In one respect, Washington enjoyed less authority than some state counterparts. As
noted a few state executives could impose a temporary embargo during a legislative recess.
Washington, however, lacked such authority, as is evidenced by his request that Congress
impose one. 88 He perhaps understood that while the price of wartime material might
decline in the wake of an export ban that fact alone hardly suggested that commanders in
chiefs could impose the bar. After all, he lacked all sorts of powers that would have been
militarily useful. The Commander in Chief likely understood that because he lacked
authority, ex officio, to impress supplies, it made little sense to suppose that he would have
the far less consequential authority to take measures that merely decreased the cost of
military supplies in the short term, such as imposing embargoes.
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